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The distinction between a theory’s kinematics and its dynamics, that is, between the space of
physical states it posits and its law of evolution, is central to the conceptual framework of many
physicists. A change to the kinematics of a theory, however, can be compensated by a change
to its dynamics without empirical consequence, which strongly suggests that these features of the
theory, considered separately, cannot have physical significance. It must therefore be concluded
(with apologies to Minkowski) that henceforth kinematics by itself, and dynamics by itself, are
doomed to fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an
independent reality. The notion of causal structure seems to provide a good characterization of this
union.
Proposals for physical theories generally have two com-
ponents: the first is a specification of the space of physical
states that are possible according to the theory, generally
called the kinematics of the theory, while the second de-
scribes the possibilities for the evolution of the physical
state, called the dynamics. This distinction is ubiqui-
tous. Not only do we recognize it as a feature of the
empirically successful theories of the past, such as New-
tonian mechanics and Maxwell’s theory of electromag-
netism, it persists in relativistic and quantum theories
as well and is even conspicuous in proposals for novel
physical theories. Consider, for instance, some recent
proposals for how to unify quantum theory and gravity.
Fay Dowker describes the idea of causal histories as fol-
lows [1]:
The hypothesis that the deep structure of
spacetime is a discrete poset characterises
causal set theory at the kinematical level;
that is, it is a proposition about what sub-
stance is the subject of the theory. However,
kinematics needs to be completed by dynam-
ics, or rules about how the substance behaves,
if one is to have a complete theory.
She then proceeds to describe the dynamics. As another
example, Carlo Rovelli describes the basics of loop quan-
tum gravity in the following terms [2]:
The kinematics of the theory is well under-
stood both physically (quanta of area and vol-
ume, discrete geometry) and from the math-
ematical point of view. The part of the the-
ory that is not yet fully under control is the
dynamics, which is determined by the Hamil-
tonian constraint.
In the field of quantum foundations, there is a particu-
larly strong insistence that any well-formed proposal for
a physical theory must specify both kinematics and dy-
namics. For instance, Sheldon Goldstein describes the
deBroglie-Bohm interpretation [3] by specifying its kine-
matics and its dynamics [4]:
In Bohmian mechanics a system of particles
is described in part by its wave function,
evolving, as usual, according to Schro¨dinger’s
equation. However, the wave function pro-
vides only a partial description of the system.
This description is completed by the specifi-
cation of the actual positions of the particles.
The latter evolve according to the “guiding
equation,” which expresses the velocities of
the particles in terms of the wave function.
John Bell provides a similar description of his proposal
for a pilot-wave theory for fermions in his characteristi-
cally whimsical style [5]:
In the beginning God chose 3-space and 1-
time, a Hamiltonian H, and a state vector |0〉 .
Then She chose a fermion configuration n (0) .
This She chose at random from an ensemble
of possibilities with distribution D (0) related
to the already chosen state vector |0〉 . Then
She left the world alone to evolve according to
[the Schro¨dinger equation] and [a stochastic
jump equation for the fermion configuration].
The distinction persists in the Everett interpretation [6],
where the set of possible physical states is just the set of
pure quantum states, and the dynamics is simply given
by Schro¨dinger’s equation (the appearance of collapses is
taken to be a subjective illusion). It is also present in
dynamical collapse theories [7, 8], where the kinematics
is often taken to be the same as in Everett’s approach —
nothing but wavefunction — while the dynamics is given
by a stochastic equation that is designed to yield a good
approximation to Schro¨dinger dynamics for microscopic
systems and to the von Neumann projection postulate
for macroscopic systems.
While proponents of different interpretations of quan-
tum theory and proponents of different approaches to
quantizing gravity may disagree about the correct kine-
matics and dynamics, they typically agree that any pro-
posal must be described in these terms.
In this essay, I will argue that the distinction is, in fact,
conventional: kinematics and dynamics only have physi-
cal significance when considered jointly, not separately.
In essence, I adopt the following methodological princi-
ple: any difference between two physical models that does
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2not yield a difference at the level of empirical phenomena
does not correspond to a physical difference and should
be eliminated. Such a principle was arguably endorsed
by Einstein when, from the empirical indistinguishability
of inertial motion in free space on the one hand and free-
fall in a gravitational field on the other, he inferred that
one must reject any model which posits a physical differ-
ence between these two scenarios (the strong equivalence
principle).
Such a principle does not force us to operationalism,
the view that one should only seek to make claims about
the outcomes of experiments. For instance, if one didn’t
already know that the choice of gauge in classical electro-
dynamics made no difference to its empirical predictions,
then discovery of this fact would, by the lights of the
principle, lead one to renounce real status for the vec-
tor potential in favour of only the electric and magnetic
field strengths. It would not, however, justify a blanket
rejection of any form of microscopic reality.
As another example, consider the prisoners in Plato’s
cave who live out their lives seeing objects only through
the shadows they cast. Suppose one of the prisoners
strikes upon the idea that there is a third dimension,
that objects have a three-dimensional shape, and that the
patterns they see are just two-dimensional projections of
this shape. She has constructed a hidden variable model
for the phenomena. Suppose a second prisoner suggests
a different hidden variable model, where in addition to
the shape, each object has a property called colour which
is completely irrelevant to the shadow that it casts. The
methodological principle dictates that because the colour
property can be varied without empirical consequence, it
must be rejected as unphysical. The shape, on the other
hand, has explanatory power and the principle finds no
fault with it. Operationalism, of course, would not even
entertain the possibility of such hidden variables.
The principle tells us to constrain our model-building
in such a way that every aspect of the posited reality
has some explanatory function. If one takes the view
that part of achieving an adequate explanation of a phe-
nomenon is being able to make predictions about the
outcomes of interventions and the truths of counterfac-
tuals, then what one is seeking is a causal account of
the phenomenon. This suggests that the framework that
should replace kinematics and dynamics is one that fo-
cuses on causal structure. I will, in fact, conclude with
some arguments in favour of this approach.
Different formulations of classical mechanics
Already in classical physics there is ambiguity about
how to make the separation between kinematics and dy-
namics. In what one might call the Newtonian for-
mulation of classical mechanics, the kinematics is given
by configuration space, while in the Hamiltonian formu-
lation, it is given by phase space, which considers the
canonical momentum for every independent coordinate
to be on an equal footing with the coordinate. For in-
stance, for a single particle, the kinematics of the Newto-
nian formulation is the space of possible positions while
that of the Hamiltonian formulation is the space of pos-
sible pairs of values of position and momentum. The two
formulations are still able to make the same empirical
predictions because they posit different dynamics. In the
Newtonian approach, motion is governed by the Euler-
Lagrange equations which are second-order in time, while
in the Hamiltonian approach, it is governed by Hamil-
ton’s equations which are first order in time.
So we can change the kinematics from configuration
space to phase space and maintain the same empirical
predictions by adjusting the dynamics accordingly. It’s
not possible to determine which kinematics, Newtonian
or Hamiltonian, is the correct kinematics. Nor can we de-
termine the correct dynamics in isolation. The kinemat-
ics and dynamics of a theory can only ever be subjected
to experimental trial as a pair.
On the possibility of violating unitarity in quantum
dynamics
Many researchers have suggested that the correct the-
ory of nature might be one that shares the kinematics
of standard quantum theory, but which posits a differ-
ent dynamics, one that is not represented by a unitary
operator. There have been many different motivations
for considering this possibility. Dynamical collapse the-
orists, for instance, seek to relieve the tension between a
system’s free evolution and its evolution due to a mea-
surement. Others have been motivated to resolve the
black hole information loss paradox. Still others have
proposed such theories simply as foils against which the
predictions of quantum theory can be tested [9].
Most of these proposals posit a dynamics which is lin-
ear in the quantum state (more precisely, in the density
operator representing the state). For instance, this is true
of the prominent examples of dynamical collapse models,
such as the proposal of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber [7]
and the continuous spontaneous localization model [8].
This linearity is not an incidental feature of these models.
Most theories which posit dynamics that are nonlinear
also allow superluminal signalling, in contradiction with
relativity theory [10]. Such nonlinearity can also lead to
trouble with the second law of thermodynamics [11].
There is an important theorem about linear dynamics
that is critical for our analysis: such dynamics can al-
ways be understood to arise by adjoining to the system
of interest an auxiliary system prepared in some fixed
quantum state, implementing a unitary evolution on the
composite, and finally throwing away or ignoring the aux-
iliary system. This is known as the Stinespring dilation
theorem [12] and is well-known to quantum information
3theorists1.
All proposals for nonunitary but linear modifications
of quantum theory presume that it is in fact possible to
distinguish the predictions of these theories from those
of standard quantum mechanics. For instance, the ex-
perimental evidence that is championed as the “smoking
gun” which would rule in favour of such a modification is
anomalous decoherence — an increase in the entropy of
the quantum state of a system which cannot be accounted
for by an interaction with the system’s environment. Ev-
eryone admits that such a signature is extremely difficult
to detect if it exists. But the point I’d like to make here is
that even if such anomalous decoherence were detected,
it would not vindicate the conclusion that the dynamics is
nonunitary. Because of the Stinespring dilation theorem,
such decoherence is also consistent with the assumption
that there are some hitherto-unrecognized degrees of free-
dom and that the quantum system under investigation is
coupled unitarily to these2.
So, while it is typically assumed that such an anomaly
would reveal that quantum theory was mistaken in its
dynamics, we could just as well take it to reveal that
quantum theory was correct in its dynamics but mistaken
in its kinematics. The experimental evidence alone can-
not decide the issue. By the lights of our methodological
principle, it follows that the distinction must be purely
conventional.
Freedom in the choice of kinematics for pilot-wave
theories
The pilot-wave theory of deBroglie and Bohm supple-
ments the wavefunction with additional variables, but it
turns out that there is a great deal of freedom in how to
choose these variables. A simple example of this arises
for the case of spin. Bohm, Schiller, and Tiomno have
proposed that particles with spin should be modeled as
extended rigid objects and that the spinor wavefunction
should be supplemented not only with the positions of
the particles (as is standardly done for particles without
spin), but with their orientation in space as well [13]. In
addition to the equation which governs the evolution of
the spinor wavefunction (the Pauli equation), they pro-
pose a guidance equation that specifies how the positions
and orientations evolve over time.
1 It is analogous to the fact that one can simulate indeterministic
dynamics on a system by deterministic dynamics which couples
the system to an additional degree of freedom that is probabilis-
tically distributed.
2 A collapse theorist will no doubt reject this explanation on the
grounds that one cannot solve the quantum measurement prob-
lem while maintaining unitarity. Nonetheless, our argument
shows that someone who does not share their views on the quan-
tum measurement problem need not be persuaded of a failure of
unitarity.
But there is another, more minimalist, proposal for
how to deal with spin, due to Bell [14]. The only vari-
ables that supplement the wavefunction in his approach
are the particle positions. The theory nonetheless makes
the same predictions as the one without spin because the
equations of motion for the particle positions depend on
the spinor wavefunction. These two approaches make ex-
actly the same experimental predictions. This is possible
because our experience of quantum phenomena consists
of observations of macroscopic variables such as pointer
positions rather than direct observation of the properties
of the particle.
The non-uniqueness of the choice of kinematics for
pilot-wave theories is not isolated to spin. It is generic.
The case of quantum electrodynamics (QED) illustrates
this well. Not only is there a pilot-wave theory for QED,
there are multiple viable proposals, all of which produce
the same empirical predictions. You could follow Bohm’s
treatment of the electromagnetic field, where the quan-
tum state is supplemented by the configuration of the
electric field [15]. Alternatively, you could make the
supplementary variable the magnetic field, or any other
linear combination of the two. For the charges, you
could use Bell’s discrete model of fermions on a lattice
(mentioned in the introduction), where the supplemen-
tary variables are the fermion numbers at every lattice
point [5]. Or, if you preferred, you could use Colin’s con-
tinuum version of this model[16]. If you fancy something
a bit more exotic, you might prefer to adopt Struyve
and Westman’s minimalist pilot-wave theory for QED,
which treats charges in a manner akin to how Bell treats
spin [17]. Here, the variables that are taken to sup-
plement the quantum states are just the electric field
strengths. No variables for the charges are introduced.
By virtue of Gauss’s law, the field nonetheless carries an
image of all the charges and hence it carries an image of
the pointer positions. This image is what we infer when
our eyes detect the fields. But the charges are an illusion.
And, of course, according to this model the stuff of which
we are made is not charges either: we are fields observing
fields.
The existence of many empirically adequate versions of
Bohmian mechanics has led many commentators to ap-
peal to principles of simplicity or elegance to try to decide
among them. An alternative response is suggested by our
methodological principle: any feature of the theory that
varies among the different versions is not physical.
Kinematical locality and dynamical locality
I consider one final example, the one that first set me
down the path of doubting the significance of the dis-
tinction between kinematics and dynamics. It concerns
different notions of locality within ontological models of
quantum theory. Such models posit that systems are de-
scribed by properties, the complete specification of which
is called the ontic state of the system, and that measure-
4ments reveal information about those properties [18].
It is natural to say that an ontological model has kine-
matical locality if, for any two systems A and B, every
ontic state λAB of the composite is simply a specification
of the ontic state of each component,
λAB = (λA, λB) .
In such a theory, once you have specified all the properties
of A and of B, you have specified all of the properties of
the composite AB. In other words, kinematical locality
says that there are no holistic properties 3.
It is also natural to define a dynamical notion of local-
ity for relativistic theories: a change to the ontic state λS
of a localized system S cannot be a result of a change to
the ontic state λS′ of a localized system S
′ if S′ is outside
the backward light-cone of S. In other words, against the
backdrop of a relativistic space-time, this notion of local-
ity asserts that all causal influences propagate at speeds
that are no faster than the speed of light.
Note that this definition of dynamical locality has
made reference to the ontic state λS of a localized sys-
tem S. If S is part of a composite system with holistic
properties, then the ontic state of this composite, λSS′′ ,
need not factorize into λS and λS′′ therefore we cannot
necessarily even define λS . In this sense, the dynamical
notion of locality already presumes the kinematical one.
It is possible to derive Bell inequalities starting from
these assumptions of locality (and a few other assump-
tions such as the freedom of measurement settings and
the absence of retrocausal influences). Famously, quan-
tum theory predicts a violation of the Bell inequalities.
In the face of this violation, one must give up one or more
of the assumptions. Locality is a prime candidate to con-
sider and if we do so, then the following question natu-
rally arises: is it possible to accommodate violations of
Bell inequalities by admitting a failure of the dynamical
notion of locality while salvaging the kinematical notion?
It turns out that for any realist interpretations of quan-
tum theory wherein the ontic state encodes the quantum
state (ψ-ontic models in the terminology of Ref. [19])),
there is a failure of both sorts of locality. In such models,
kinematical locality fails simply by virtue of the existence
of entangled states. This is the case for all of the interpre-
tations enumerated in the introduction: Everett, collapse
theories, and deBroglie-Bohm. Might there nonetheless
be some alternative to these interpretations that does
manage to salvage kinematical locality?
I’ve told the story in such a way that this seems to be a
perfectly meaningful question. But I would like to argue
that, in fact, it is not.
To see this, it suffices to realize that it is trivial to build
a model of quantum theory that salvages kinematical lo-
cality. For example, we can do so by a slight modifica-
tion of the deBroglie-Bohm model. Because the particle
3 The assumption has also been called separability [19].
positions can be specified locally, the only obstacle to
satisfying kinematical locality is that the other part of
the ontology, the universal wavefunction, does not fac-
torize across systems and thus must describe a holistic
property of the universe. This conclusion, however, re-
lied on a particular way of associating the wavefunction
with space-time. Can we imagine a different association
that would make the model kinematically local? Sure.
Just put a copy of the universal wavefunction at every
point in space. It can then pilot the motion of every par-
ticle by a local influence. Alternatively, you could put it
at the location of the center of mass of the universe and
have it achieve its piloting by superluminal influence —
remember, we are allowing arbitrary violations of dynam-
ical locality. Or, put it under the corner of my doormat
and let it choreograph all of the particles in the universe
from there.
The point is that the failure of dynamical locality yields
so much leeway in the dynamics that one can easily ac-
commodate any sort of kinematics, including a local kine-
matics. Of course, these models are not credible and no
one would seriously propose them 4, but what this sug-
gests to me is not that we should look for nicer models,
but rather that the question of whether one can salvage
kinematical locality was not an interesting one after all.
The mistake, I believe, was to take seriously the distinc-
tion between kinematics and dynamics.
Summary of the argument
A clear pattern has emerged. In all of the examples
considered, we seem to be able to accommodate wildly
different choices of kinematics in our models without
changing their empirical predictions simply by modifying
the dynamics, and vice-versa. This strikes me as strong
evidence for the view that the distinction between kine-
matics and dynamics — a distinction that is often central
to the way that physicists characterize their best theories
and to the way they constrain their theory-building — is
purely conventional and should be abandoned.
From kinematics and dynamics to causal structure
Although it is not entirely clear at this stage what
survives the elimination of the distinction between kine-
matics and dynamics, I would like to suggest a promising
candidate: the concept of causal structure.
In recent years, there has been significant progress in
providing a rigorous mathematical formalism for express-
ing causal relations and for making inferences from these
4 Norsen has proposed a slightly more credible model but only
as a proof of principle that kinematical locality can indeed be
achieved[20].
5about the consequences of interventions and the truths of
counterfactuals. The work has been done primarily by re-
searchers in the fields of statistics, machine learning, and
philosophy and is well summarized in the texts by Spirtes,
Glymour, and Scheines [21], and Pearl [22]. According
to this approach, the causal influences that hold among
a set of classical variables can be modeled by the arrows
in a directed acyclic graph, of the sort depicted in Figs. 1
and 2, together with some causal-statistical parameters
describing the strengths of the influences. If Parents (X)
denote the variables that are direct causes, i.e. causal
parents, of a variable X, then the causal-statistical pa-
rameters are conditional probabilities P (X|Parents (X))
for every X. If a variable X has no parents within the
model, then one simply specifies P (X). The graph and
the parameters together constitute the causal model.
It remains only to see why this framework has some
hope of capturing the nonconventional elements of the
various examples I have presented.
The strongest argument in favour of this framework
is that it provides a way to move beyond kinemati-
cal and dynamical notions of locality. John Bell was
someone who clearly endorsed the kinematical-dynamical
paradigm of model-building, as the quote in the intro-
duction illustrates, and who recognized the distinction
among notions of locality, referring to models satisfying
kinematical locality as theories of “local beables” [23].
In his most precise formulation of the notion of local-
ity, however, which he called local causality, he appears
to have transcended the paradigm of kinematics and dy-
namics and made an early foray into the new paradigm
of causal structure.
Consider a Bell-type experiment. A pair of systems,
labeled A and B, are prepared together and then taken
to distant locations. The variable that specifies the
choice of measurement on A (respectively B) is denoted
S(respectively T ) and the variable specifying the mea-
surement’s outcome is denoted X(respectively Y ). Bell
interprets the question of whether a set of correlations
P (XY |ST ) admits of a locally causal explanation as the
question of whether the correlations between X and Y
can be entirely explained by a common cause λ, that is,
whether they can be explained by a causal graph of the
form illustrated in Fig. 1. From the causal model, we
derive that
P (XY |ST ) =
∑
λ
P (X|Sλ)P (Y |Tλ)P (λ),
Correlations P (XY |ST ) of this form can be shown to
satisfy certain inequalities, called the Bell inequalities,
which can be tested by experiments (and are found to be
violated in a quantum world).
If we think of the variable λ as the ontic state of the
composite AB, then we see that we have not needed to
specify whether or not λ factorizes as (λA, λB) . Bell
recognized this fact and emphasized it in his later writing:
“It is notable that in this argument nothing is said about
the locality, or even localizability, of the variable λ [24].”
In other words, Bell managed to make empirical claims
about a class of ontological models without needing to
make any commitments about the separate nature of the
kinematics and the dynamics of those models! I suggest
that this approach should be considered a template for
future physics.
FIG. 1: The causal graph associated with Bell’s notion
of local causality
It is not as clear how the paradigm of causal struc-
ture overcomes the conventionality of the kinematics-
dynamics distinction in the other examples I’ve pre-
sented, but there are some interesting clues that this is
the right track.
Consider the example of Hamiltonian and Newtonian
formulations of mechanics. If we let Qi denote a coor-
dinate at time ti and Pi its canonically conjugate mo-
mentum, then the causal models associated respectively
with the two approaches are depicted in Fig. 2. The fact
that Hamiltonian dynamics is first-order in time implies
that the Q and P variables at a given time are causally
influenced directly only by the Q and P at the previous
time. Meanwhile, the second-order nature of Newtonian
dynamics is captured by the fact that Q at a given time
is causally influenced directly by the Qs at two previous
times. In both models, we have a causal influence from
Q1 to Q3, but in the Newtonian case it is direct, while in
the Hamiltonian case it is mediated by P2. Nonetheless,
the kinds of correlations that can be made to hold be-
tween Q1 and Q3 are the same regardless of whether the
causal influence is direct or mediated by P2
5. The conse-
quences for Q3 of interventions upon the value of Q1 also
are insensitive to this difference. So from the perspective
of the paradigm of causal structure, the Hamiltonian and
Newtonian formulations appear less distinct than they do
if one focusses on kinematics and dynamics.
Empirical predictions of statistical theories are typi-
cally expressed in terms of statistical dependences among
variables that are observed or controlled. My guiding
methodological principle suggests that we should confine
our attention to those causal features that are relevant
for such dependences. In other words, although we can
5 There is a subtlety here: it follows from the form of the causal
graph in the Newtonian model that Q1 and Q4 are conditionally
independent given Q2 and Q3, but in the Hamiltonian case, this
fact must be inferred from the causal-statistical parameters.
6FIG. 2: Causal graphs for Hamiltonian and Newtonian
formulations of mechanics respectively.
convert a particular claim about kinematics and dynam-
ics into a causal graph, not all features of this graph
will have relevance for statistical dependences. Recent
work that seeks to infer causal structure from observed
correlations has naturally gravitated towards the notion
of equivalence classes of causal graphs, where the equiva-
lence relation is the ability to produce the same set of cor-
relations. One could also try to characterize equivalence
classes of causal models while allowing for restrictions on
the forms of the conditional probabilities or when one al-
lows not only observations of variables but interventions
upon them. Such equivalence classes, or something like
them, seem to be the best candidates for the mathemati-
cal objects in terms of which our classical models should
be described.
Finally, by replacing conditional probabilities with
quantum operations, one can define a quantum general-
ization of causal models —quantum causal models [25, 26]
— which appear promising for providing a realist inter-
pretation of quantum theory. It is equivalence classes of
causal structures here that are likely to provide the best
framework for future physics.
The paradigm of kinematics and dynamics has served
us well. So well, in fact, that it is woven deeply into
the fabric of our thinking about physical theories and
will not be easily supplanted. I have nonetheless argued
that we must abandon it. Meanwhile, the paradigm of
causal structure is nascent, unfamiliar and incomplete,
but it seems ideally suited to capturing the nonconven-
tional distillate of the union of kinematics and dynamics
and it can already claim an impressive achievement in
the form of Bell’s notion of local causality.
Rest in peace kinematics and dynamics. Long live
causal structure!
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